I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a mathematical tool using which conflicting interest situations is handled. In recent times much attention has been drawn to interval valued game, Nayak and Pal [1, 2, 3] , Narayanan [4] , Nishizaki [5] . In practical situations the pay-offs are given within certain ranges rather than as an exact number. These uncertain situations are overcome when we use interval numbers as pay-offs. An interval number is an extension of a real number andalso subset of a real lineℜ Moore [6] . Zimmermann [7] shows that α-cut of a fuzzy number is an interval number. The method of solution of a matrix game using interval numbers was already established, Nayak and Pal [3] . In Narayanan [4] , probability and possibility approaches have been used to solve a 2x2 interval game but no certain distribution function has been used. Moreover, reduction of an mxn game to a 2x2 sub game is a basic problem in an interval game. In dominance method [1] , if the convex combination of any two rows (columns) of a pay-off matrix is dominated by the third row (column) then it indicates that the third move of the row (column) of the player will be an optimal move but we are not certain as to which one of the first two moves will be an optimal one. This disadvantage is overcome through the graphical method [2] . However, this is not the method of solution but a state of art technique, where an mx2 or 2xnparticular type interval game is reduced to 2x2 interval sub games. But the situation may arise where more than two decision makers are involved and that situation is handled by bi-matrix game. Fuzziness, in bi-matrix games, was studied by many authors [8, 9, 10] . Nayak and Pal [11] described bi-matrix games with interval pay-off and its Nash equilibrium strategy. In this paper we have described Bi-matrix game with trapezoidal fuzzy pay off. We have described the arithmetic operation and inequality relation of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers .We defined Nash equilibrium solution of such games and tried to get the solution as a trapezoidal fuzzy number. The numerical example illustrates the theory.
II. SYMMETRIC TRAPEZOIDAL NUMBER
Here we will pay attention on some definitions and notations of symmetric trapezoidal fuzzy number. Our aim is to define a fuzzy symmetric trapezoidal matrix in space of matrices. The triangular symmetric fuzzy number has already been defined. 
5. The division of these two interval numbers A andB 
IV.INEQUALITY RELATION WITH TRAPEZOIDAL NUMBERS
A comparison between trapezoidal numbers is given in this section.
Case:-1. Let A = , R , ω and B = , , ′ be two trapezoidal numbers in T(ℜ), the set of trapezoidal numbers. Here we make analogous order relation to Moore [6] as A< B (A is strictly less than B) iff + ′ < 2 − R . Here this relation is an extension of '<' on real line. This relation seems to be strict order relation that A is smaller than B. 
Acceptability Index
We use Acceptability index AI to compare and order any two trapezoidal numbers on the real line in terms of value as in [12, 2] , which are used throughout the paper. Let us consider two symmetric trapezoidal ….. (4) which is the value judgment by which ′ is inferior to ′ ( ′ is superior to ′ ) in terms of value. Here 'inferior to', 'superior to', are analogous to 'less than', 'greater than', respectively. The above observations can be put into a compact form as follows
Similarly, in the following we have given another function ′ which determines the maximum between two trapezoidal numbers. 
V. INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS INVOLVING TRAPEZOIDAL COEFFICIENTS
In this section we concentrate on the LPP in which both the objective function and coefficients of constraints are all trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Linear programming problems with interval coefficients have been studied by several researchers [3] by introducing some preference relations between interval numbers. We will follow analogous method to get inequality constraints involving trapezoidal coefficients. Following the definition of AI the inequality constraints involving trapezoidal coefficients are reduced in their crisp equivalent forms so that they can be solved easily. Let A = , R , ω and B = , , ′ ∈T(ℜ) and x is a singleton variable. Then acceptability condition of the inequality constraints Ax ≤B may be defined as Where '≤ ′denotes trapezoidal number inequality and denotes the minimal acceptance degree of constraints fixed by decision maker. Similarly the inequality constraints Ax ≤B, the satisfactory crisp equivalent can be defined in the form 
VI. TRAPEZOIDAL VALUED BI-MATRIX GAME
The TVBG is a finite non cooperative two person game. It can be considered as a natural extension of classical game to cover situations in which outcome of a decision process does not necessarily dictate the verdict that what one player gains and other has to loss. The table showing how payments should be made at the end of the game is called a payoff matrix. Let 1 and 2 denote two decision makers (DM) and let M = {1,2,3,…….m} and N = { 1,2,3…….n} be the sets of all pure strategies available for DM 1 and 2 respectively.
, , ,
denote pay offs that DM 1and2 receive when DM 1plays pure strategy i and player 2 plays pure strategy j.
Then we have following pay off matrices:-Pay -off matrix player A is Where we assume that each of the two players chooses a strategy, a payoff for each of them and it is represented as trapezoidal number. We call this game a TVBG and denote the game by Γ = 1,2 , , .
VII. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we shall define concepts of Nash equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. Bashar and olsder defined the concepts of Nash equilibrium solutions in bi-matrix games for single pair of pay off matrices and presented methodology for obtaining them.
Pure Strategy
Let 1,2 denote two decision makers(DM) and let M={1,2,3,4…m} and N={1,2,3,4 ….n} be the sets of all pure strategies available for DM1 and DM2 respectively. A Nash equilibrium solution represents an equilibrium point where each player reacts to other by choosing the option that gives him/her preference.
Definition
A pair of strategies {row r, column s} is said to constitute a Nash equilibrium solution for a TVBG Γ if the following pair of inequalities are satisfied for all i = 1, 2….m and j=1, 2…….n.
The pair , ,
′ is said to be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the TVBG.
Mixed strategy
A probabilistic situation arises when a player does not know the decision the other player takes but guesses what he can do and in that case the objective function is to maximize the expected gain. Such strategies are known as mixed strategies. Let ℜ + and ℜ + be the m and n dimensional nonnegative Euclidean spaces, respectively. Denote x = (x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,……. 
